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PREFACE
Current activity in international trade negotiations is focused on the desire by net
exporting nations to reduce trade barriers in the form of quotas and tariffs. However,
another form of trade barrier, viz. the non tariff barrier, poses an equal threat to free
trade. This Research Report focuses on the use of antidumping and countervailing
duty regulations as barriers to trade. In particular, the Report examines the situation
in the United States with respect to these measures and highlights the factors which
lead to such measures being used.
The implications of the US system are particularly relevant to countries such as New
Zealand and Australia which have significant levels of trade. "Normal" marketing
practices, such as price discrimination between markets, are targets of the antidumping
and countervailing duty regimes. The current US regulations provide for Significant
local industry protection where such practices can be demonstrated.
While negotiations over current direct trade restricting practices, such as quotas and
tariffs, may lead to some notional decline in market protection, the potential
proliferation of antidumping and countervailing duty regulations poses an even greater
threat to world trade than do more direct protection methods which are currently
under review. Therefore, attention must move to an evaluation of "other" procedures
and ways must be developed to counter such procedures through international
negotiation. While the use of antidumping and countervailing duty arrangements is
encoded within' the GATT structure, the ways in which such mechanisms are used
requires examination. It is probable that more stringent definitions of such procedures
and the times when such procedures may be used, will be required within the GAlT
format.
This Research Report brings the US situation to the attention of those concerned with
the development of trade opportunities and highlights the urgent need to begin to
bring this activity to the notice of those involved in trade access negotiations. It is
interesting to note that at the time of the Report going to Press, a case is being
pursued in the US against New Zealand kiwifruit with Californian growers
complaining of price discrimination practices.
This Research Report forms the first in a series of Reports which will be published on
trade matters. The Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit (AERU) is undertaking
a programme of research in this area with particular attention to the international
sheepmeat market situation. The research programme has been funded by the
Agriculture and Market Research and Development Trust (AGMARDT) and will
proceed over a period of three years.
Prof A C Zwart
DIRECTOR
v

SUMMARY
The strong appreciation of the U.S. Dollar between 1980 and 1985 induced a surge in imports
into the United States for a wide variety of products. This, in turn, increased the demand
for trade protection. Many of these demands were satisfied via U.S. antidumping and
countervail regulations, yielding ad valorem tariffs well above current average duties. Import
protection can benefit not only the protection-seeker, but also those who provide relief. A
principal-agent model is developed that describes the potential gains to both the regulatory
agency and the legislator. Empirical results support the model specification, finding both
exchange rate and political cycles.
vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Trade protection is generally acknowledged to have increased in the United States during the
1980s.1 Several explanations of this phenomena have been made in the literature, with two
being pertinent here. First was the appreciation of the dollar between 1980 and 1985.2 This
persistent rise let to an increase in imports of products that compete with those of U.S.
domestic firms, hence the increased clamour for protection. The second explanation for the
rise in import restrictions lies in the more accessible trade "remedies" available to the
protection seeker.3 Firms "injured" by imports could, among other things, search for ways
to lower costs, accept lower profits for the duration of the appreciation, or appeal for
protection. The last was seen by many as the least-cost solution.
The above explanations are not independent. The dollar's 1980-85 appreciation raised the
demand for import restrictions. However, the supply of protection "remedies" has also
changed. The emphasis is now on regulatory protection, exemplified by antidumping and
'countervailing duty determinations. The move to this type of protection was predicted by
Finger, Hall, and Nelson (1982). The trend has been to deemphasise protection achieved
through overtly political (legislative) channels. Jones (1986), in the prime example of an
industry using available import-restricting institutions, traces the postwar protection accorded
the U.S. steel industry, showing how it moved from attempts to impose quotas through
Congress in the 1960s, to the use of antidumping and countervail regulations in the 1970s
and 1980s. Eichengreen and van der Yen (1981) point to changes in the Trade Act of 1974,
in particular, that encouraged the use of antidumping petitions. Appeals for import
restrictions for many products are now directed exclusively into administrative solutions.
A bureaucratic solution, is, by definition, one of specific rules in an inflexible order.4 Thus,
a plea for trade protection presented in the proper form to the appropriate agency, and which
followed all the rules of stepping through a "perfect" administrative procedure, or algorithm,
would always result in some specific import restriction. Regulations evolve, via legislation
and bureaucratic discretion, ever closer to this "ideal" protection regime.
An antidumping duty is imposed in cases of price discrimination in which the U.S. customer
pays the lower of two prices. A successful petition for protection typically results in a tariff
that forces the U.S. consumer to pay the higher price.s A duty may also be levied in an
antidumping case if the producer charges less than the cost of production. A countervailing
duty is designed to offset subsidies paid by the exporting country.
Opposition to potential antidumping and countervailing duties by domestic groups, such as
tSee Rowley and Tollison (1988), for example.
2gee Haberler (1988), Corden (1987), Dornbusch (1986) and McCulloch (1988).
3Baldwin (1989) and Bhagwati (1988).
4The second definition under ''bureaucracy'' in Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (Fifth Edition) states that it is "officialism in
government; rigid, formal measures of routine procedure in administration."
S'fhe U.S. price is compared to either a price in the exporting country or to a price in a third country. In an antidumping
case involving off-road motorcycles from Japan, for example, the duty was based on higher prices on such vehicles in Canada.
There were very few sold in Japan, thus a domestic price in Japan could not be established.
1
2consumers or retailers, is mitigated in three ways. First, and most important, the rules
preclude adversarial participation; dissenting domestic concerns are irrelevant to the decision
rules.6 Second, the complexity of the process makes the cost of understanding the issues
very high, especially when there is little payoff. Third, there will be little open discussion
which could arouse opposition. Newspaper coverage, for example, of antidumping and
countervail cases is often limited to ex post decisions.
6Finger, Hall and Nelson refer to the "disenfranchising" of the opposition (1982,p.454). Vermulst (1987, p.66) notes that the
"interested parties" are defined as (1) a foreign manufacturer, exporter, or U.S. importer of the merchandise under investigation
(includes trade or business associations); (2) the government of the country of manufacture or export; (3) a m;mufacturer or
wholesaler of the product in the United States; (4) a certified union or group of workers recognized as representative of the U.S.
industry; (5) a business or wholesale association, the members of which are composed of (3); or (6) an association, the majority
of whose members are composed of(3), (4), and/or (5) with respect to a like product. There are no consumer groups, industries
using the products as inputs, or exporters that may challenge the decision. See the Federal Register, December, 1988, p.52345,
for a description of "interested parties" to countervail investigations. The regulation adds, in response to the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act.of 1988, a "seller in the United States of the like product produced in the United States" as one
potential"interested party." Sellers of imports are still excluded. The definition of an "interested party" for antidumping cases
is identical (Federal Register, March 28, 1989,1'.12771).
CHAPTER 2
THE TWIN TOWERS OF BUREAUCRATIC PROTECTION
There are two U.S. government agencies involved in the disposition of antidumping and
countervail cases. The International Trade Commission (ITC) decides, via a quasi-judicial
process, whether or not a domestic industry (as represented by those parties submitting a
petition in a countervail or antidumping case) has been materially "injured" by imports? The
ITC is an independent agency. The International Trade Administration (ITA), of the
Department of Commerce, determines the size of antidumping and countervail duties. The
dichotomy is then that the ITC looks at the domestic picture for an industry while the ITA
examines that industry's foreign competitors.
The ITC was established by Congress in the Trade Act of 1974 to supplant the Tariff
Commission. There are six coIiunissioners who vote on decisions concerning trade issues.
All are appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation. No more than three may
be from the same political party, thus earning the appellation "bipartisan". However, merely
'because an agent is ''bipartisan'' does not mean that the wishes of Congress cannot be
satisfied. Baldwin (1985, p.89) points out, for example, that the President has no authority
to recommend or change the budget of the ITC. The ITC is dependent solely upon Congress
in receiving and justifying its revenue.
Moore (1989) provides evidence that ITC "bipartisanship" is less than independence. He finds
that constituencies of members of the Subcommittee on Trade of the Senate Finance
Committee are more likely to get a favourable ruling from the ITC in antidumping cases.
However, he was unable to find any pattern of support for constituents of the House
Subcommittee on Trade of the Ways and Means Committee.
Moore does not test for it politica.l cycle or use exchange rates to predict the outcome of ITC
decisions. He does find, however, that ITC antidumping injury decisions (in the absence of
Congressional influence) are based on changes in domestic industry performance indicators
such as declines in production, profit rates, and industry employment. Declines in these
variables are taken as evidence of "material injury". '
One key focus in this study is the influence of the exogenous flexible exchange rate on the
provision of protection. Since the ITC looks only at the domestic industry, this shifts part of
our attention to the ITA, the agency that investigates the exporting industry. The ITA
establishes the duty to be imposed whenever it finds guilt in antidumping and countervail
cases.
2.1 Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases 1980-88
The authority for the investigation and determination of duties in antidumping and
countervail cases was transferred from the Treasury Department to the Commerce
Department, effective January 2, 1980, by the 1979 Trade Agreements Act. That Act also
instituted strict statutory deadlines for the processing of antidumping and countervail
7The term quasijudicial was used in the 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 Annual Report of the United States International Trade
Commission.
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4allegations.s The transfer from the Treasury by the 1979 Trade Agreements Act also
removed the ability of the Secretary of the Treasury to suspend collection of countervailing
duties. Senator Daniel Moynihan, a member of the Senate Finance Committee in 1979, was
asked about the relocation of responsibility from Treasury to Commerce:9
MrOlmer: Senator, was there, in your mind, any linkage
between the transfer of responsibility from the
Treasury Department to the Commerce
Department for administration of the
antidumping countervailing duty law in passage
of the 1979 Act, in this commitment that you
spoke of to future generations?10
Senator Moynihan: Yeah, there was. And it does not intend
any disparity (sic) of the Treasury, but rather
would more, I would hope, to be thought of as
a compliment to the Department of Commerce.
There is simply a metter (sic) of what the
priorities of a Department [are] .... This is the
Department of Commerce, if you will find
yourself a seal, what do you see on it?
The seal of the Department of Commerce has an eagle sitting ato,p a shield containing a
lighthouse and a ship. Moynihan could well mean that the Department of Commerce, in the
person of the ITA, acts as a beacon of vigilance for the proper course of international
commerce.
The 1979 Trade Agreements Act made a significant institutional change in the mechanism for
seeking protection through an antidumping or countervail petition: transfer of the
investigating agency and strict timetables. This study considers only those petitions directed
to the ITA between January 1,1980 and December 31,1988. The 1984 Trade Act, according
to Bello and Holmer (1985), made no substantive changes in the antidumping and
countervailing duty investigation process. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, did, however, make significant changes to antidumping provisions (Libsey, 1988).
Table 1details the course of investigation of antidumping and countervailing duty cases prior
to the assignment of any tariffs. The 1980-88 period saw 582 petitions filed. The most, 51,
came against Japan. Among other particularly popular country marks: Brazil with 43, 34 for
Canada, 34 for Mexico, 32 for South Korea and 31 for TaiwanY There were 351 antidumping
SVermulst (1987, p.176, fn.314) quotes the House Report on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979:
The [Ways and Means] Committee is very dissatisfied with the past record of the Secretaries of the Treasury in
assessing duties on entries subject to a dumping finding. Unless dumping duties are assessed in a timely fashion,
the remedial effect of the law is negated. In this regard, the Committee finds the 3- to 3 and one-half year period
average delay between entry of merchandise and assessment of duties unacceptable.
9From the Conference on Novel Issues. Held in Washington, D.C. November 4, 1983. Recorded by Free State Reporting, Inc.,
of Annapolis, Maryland.
lOlbld, p.8 Senator Moynihan stated that one of the purposes of the GATT Subsidies Code which was incorporated in, according
to MID, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, was to save "future generations" from the ravages of subsidised competition.
According to Senator Moynihan, the jobs of thousands of future Americans are owed to the foresight of the Senate Finance
CommlttCl0.
llCountry dOII1111& contained in Stallings (1990) and is available upon request.
Table 1
Summary of antidumping and countervail activity, petitions filed
between 1980 and 1988, through the preliminary ITC "inj!ll"yt' determinations
Item 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Total
Petitions filed with the ITA 24 23 94 69 95 101 100 23 53 582
Antidumping 16 12 34 50 51 62 71 15 40 351
Countervail 8 11 60 19 44 39 29 8 13 231
Petitions dismissed or cancelled 0 1 2 1 0 4 3 1 0 0 12
Cases initialised by the ITA 24 22 91 68 78 115 96 23 52 1 570
Days between petition and initiation 24.6 15.0 24.3 26.4 26.8 26.6 26.8 25.6 26.1 27.0 26.1
ITC preliminary determinations 15 15 69 42 59 92 94 21 45 3 455
Antidumping 12 12 31 39 43 69 67 18 37 3 331
Countervail 3 3 38 3 16 23 27 3 8 0 124
Total positive 10 11 60 34 51 79 78 20 43 2 388
Antidumping 7 9 27 31 39 61 56 17 35 2 284
Countervail 3 2 33 3 12 18 22 3 8 0 104
Total negative 5 4 9 8 8 13 16 1 2 1 67
Antidumping 5 3 4 8 4 8 11 1 2 1 47
Countervail 0 1 5 0 4 5 5 0 0 0 20
Days between petition and ITC preliminary 61.6 60.1 52.5 47.6 50.6 46.0 47.6 46.0 45.9 54.0 49.0
6cases. Japan led with 50 cases. Other popular targets for antidumping petitions were Brazil
and Canada with 23 each, Taiwan with 25, West Germany with 20,"and South Korea with 22.
There were 231 countervail cases dUring the study period. The most frequent target was
Mexico, facing 28 petitions during 1980 through 1988. Other marks include Brazil (20),
France (13), Spain (11), Canada (11) and South Korea (10).
The ITA is required to initiate antidumping and countervailing duty cases within 20 working
days from the receipt of the petition. The initiation is a certification that the petitioner is an
"interested party" and that there are sufficient grounds for investigation. The 582 petitions
received during 1980-88 resulted in 570 investigations actually begun between 1980 and 1988;
one case was initiated in 1989. Twelve cases, ten antidumping and two countervail, had
petitions either rejected or withdrawn before iriitiation.
The initiation of the investigation is the formal notification to both the plaintiff and the
defendant that further information, mostly from the defendant, is to be requested. The
defendant's responses are available for review and comment by the petitioner or other
"interested parties" during the course of the inquiryP
The next step is a preliminary injury determination by the lTC, required within 45 days of
the petition being filed. This must be completed for all antidumping cases, but only for those
countervailing duty cases that involve signatories to the GATT subsidies code or where the
imported good is nondutiable. A negative preliminary injury determination at this point
closes the case. The ITC relies solely on the content of the petition, subject to verification.
Only 455 of the 570 cases initiated had to have a preliminary decision from the ITC. There
were 331 antidumping cases13 and 124 countervail cases. Thus, 94 percent of all
antidumping cases, but only 54 percent of countervail cases went to a preliminary ITC
decision.
The ITC did make a number of negative determinations, closing 67 cases. The overall success
rate is, at this stage, 86.2 percent (503 out of 582 cases), but is different for antidumping than
for countervailing duty cases. Only 20 countervailing duty cases are included in the
"negative" ITC determination category, compared with 47 antidumping cases. The 16.2
percent failllre rate for countervail is higher than that for antidumping cases. Countervail
cases may also be affected if the accused country decides to sign the GATT subsidies code.
The case is then "reinitialized" by the ITA and the ITC issues an injury determination.14
The positive decision reached by the ITC at this point is the first overt step in imposing costs
on a possible defendant. The case then goes back to the ITA for determination of preliminary
antidumping margins or subsidy rates. The failure of a company or importer to defend itself
in accordance with the rules of evidence (as set by the ITA) automatically results in the
information in the petition being used to determine the preliminary outcome. The case of
l'See supra note 6, page 2, for a definition of interested parties.
l3Ten antidumping cases were resolved after initiation but prior to the ITC preliminary determination by export restraints,
dismissal of the petition, or combining petitions.
HCountrles which became parties to the Subsidies Code in the midst of investigations include the Philippines, New Zealand,
and Mexico. Prior to 23 April 1985, Mexico had not become a party to the "Subsidies Code" of the GATT. Therefore, no.injury
determination was necessary. However, after Mexico became a signatory, any countervail cases that had not resulted in a
preliminary ruling had to be resubmitted with allegations of injury. This resulted in the petitions in two cases being withdrawn:
"Converted Paper Supplies" originally filed on 16/11/84, petition withdrawn 5/17/85 (50 Federal Register 24012,7/6/85), and
"Portable Aluminium Ladders and Components" originally filed 26/3/85, petition withdrawn 2/5/85 (50 Federal Register 21480,
24/5/85).
7"Industrial Belts from South Korea" (l988) is typical, and shows the ramifications of not
responding to a request for information. The Hankook company of South Korea did not
cooperate (in the view of the ITA) and was assigned a preliminary 24.52 percent duty. The
average preliminary duty for aU South :Korean companies was only 0.51 percent. The same
was true in "Reinforcing Bars and Shapes from Mexico" (C-201-401). Companies that
"cooperated" were assigned a preliminary duty of only 1.73 percent. Companies which
"unreasonably refused to provide requested information" had products assessed 104.58
percent duties. Thus, once the case proceeds to preliminary ITA determination, the failure
to act is costly.
Table 2 covers the 503 antidumping and countervail cases surviving the ITC preliminary
injury determination. Forty-four cases were "resolved" prior to a preliminary ITA
determination, with twenty resulting in trade restrictions (all involving steel or steel
products). There were 459 total preliminary findings by the ITA, with 402 resulting in duties.
Thus, 72.5 percent, or 422 of 582 petitions, achieve either a tariff or other export restraint.
The success rate rises sharply once the ITA preliminary determinations are reached, as 87.6
percent of these decisions assigned duties.
,.he date of the preliminary decision, as published in the Federal Register, is the effective date
that the duty is imposed. A petitioner might reasonably expect, on average, a four-month
wait for a countervailing duty (123.3 days, from Table 2, including nonwork days) but a six-
month wait for an antidumping levy (184.3 days). The relevant economic question is the
tradeoff, should 'one exist, between an antidumping and counteryailing duty petition. One
may hypothesize that information requirements for countervail petitions should be greater:
specific subsidy policies of national governments and their application to individual
industries must be gathered and documented. An antidumping petition requires only that
a price difference be reported, with prices lower in the United States than somewhere else.
Therefore, the statutory requirement that a countervail case take 30 days less, and the actual
60 day difference, may be an inducement to seek a countervailing duty in addition to one for
antidumping.15 "
There is also a "learning" process in countervail cases which may encourage some free
ridership~ Once a country, such as Brazil, has been found guilty and information on its
subsidy practices has been published, subsequent filings by other U.S. industries against their
Brazilian cousins become easier. The subsidies found are often very similar (if not identical)
to those in prior cases for the same country. This does not generally, however, affect the
time reqUired for investigation; the specific type of subsidy must be verified as being used
and the amount received by each company must be determined.
The "inducement" to continue to pursue antidumping cases would then trade relative success
for the time period difference. The total number of preliminary duties applied in
antidumping cases, 248, represent a 91.5 percent success rate (out of the 271 cases). The
proportion of positive determinations also seems to have grown over time, with 96.5 percent
of preliminary determinations assessing duties between 1986 and 1988, including 51 of 52
cases decided in 1986. The overall success rate for ITA preliminary determinations in
countervail cases is 81.9 percent (154 out of the 188 cases), declining sharply in 1986-88 to
70.6 percent.
The rate of success is only part of the story, however, as the size of the duty is also
important. The overall unweighted average preliminary antidumping duty would raise the
lSUiere are often countervail petitions filed at the same time as for antidumping, especially for developing countries.
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Table 2
Summary of anti-dumping and countervail activity,
petitions filed between 1980 and 1988, preliminary ITA
Item 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Total
Case completed prior to ITA preliminary 2 1 16 4 7 11 3 0 0 0 44
Export restriction 2 0 8 1 0 9 0 0 0 0 20
Petition withdrawn, dismissed, or combined 0 1 8 3 7 2 3 0 0 0 24
ITA preliminary determinations 6 15 59 48 69 84 79 38 47 14 459
Anti-dumping 1 10 17 31 34 52 52 28 33 13 271
Countervail 5 5 42 17 35 32 27 10 14 1 188
No injury determination required 2 3 17 12 24 14 8 3 7 0 90
Injury determination required 3 2 25 5 11 18 19 7 7 1 98
Total positive 6 13 51 42 57 75 69 36 40 13 402
Anti-dumping 1 8 14 28 29 47 51 27 31 12 248
Countervail 5 5 37 14 28 28 18 9 9 1 154
No injury determination required 2 3 16 10 19 11 7 3 4 0 75
Injury determination required 3 2 21 4 9 17 11 6 5 1 79
Total negative 0 2 8 6 12 9 10 2 7 1 57
Anti-dumping 0 2 3 3 5 5 1 1 2 1 23
Countervail 0 0 5 3 7 4 9 1 5 0 34
No injury determination required 0 0 1 2 5 3 1 0 3 0 15
Injury determination required 0 0 4 1 2 1 8 1 2 0 19
Days between petition and ITA preliminary 90.0 159.1 162.7 "170.9 14304 160.4 151.0 163.5 171.7 201.5 159.3
Anti-dumping 113.0 179.7 206.3 194.9 177.4 184.8 167.7 183.9 191.1 204.9 184.3
Countervail 85.4 118.0 145.0 127.0 110.3 120.6 119.0 106.4 125.8 157.0 123.3
No injury determination required 88.0 92.3 124.9 125.7 119.2 108.4 116.9 92.0 121.4 116.9
Injury determination required 83.7 156.6 158.7 130.1 90.9 130.1 119.9 112.6 '130.2 157.0 129.2
Average duty 21.5 12.1 13.1 25.5 20.6 25.7 24.1 36.0 36.8 58.2 25.5
Anti-dumping SO.O 15.7 14.1 35.3 31.2 30.2 27.8 33.7 50.2 54.7 32.9
Countervail 15.8 4.9 12.8 7.6 lOA 18.4 17.2 42.4 5.2 103.6 14.8
No injury determination required 12.3 5.9 1604 6.7 11.2 21.6 SO.O 114.3 3.9 19.3
Injury determination required 18.1 3.4 10.4 9.8 8.7 15.9 304 11.6 6.5 103.6 10.7
.
9price of affected imports by one-third. Countervailing duties averaged 14.8 percent.
2.2 After the ITA Preliminary Decision
Once a preliminary decision has been issued, the parties may respond to the reasons given
by the ITA in reaching its determination. The ITA also attempts to gather necessary
information that was lacking for the preliminary finding. The result is that the ITA will give
a second, and final, determination of antidumping margin or subsidy rate and set the size
of the duty. This must occur (delays are permitted) within 75 days of the preliminary ruling
in both countervail and antidumping cases.
A final positive antidumping or countervailing duty finding by the ITA sends the case back
to the ITC for a final injury determination. This is required within 45 days of the final ITA
decision. The final picture for an antidumping or countervail case emerges about one year
after the petition has been filed. A negative final decision by the ITC states that no "injury"
to domestic firms has occurred. This removes any duties which have been assessed, and
leads to a refund of any paid.
Previous work has concentrated on decisionmaking by the ITC.16 However, as we have
seen, the ITC is not involved in all decisions for protection via antidumping or countervail
statutes. The ITA decisions may, of themselves, impose costs on exporters independent of
a final duty or injury ruling.
The ITA may impose current and future costs on an exporting firm. A case that goes as far
as an ITA preliminary ruling requires the importer, exporting company , or country of origin
to mount a defense.17 Failure to do so is an assumed plea of guilty as charged. Further,
a preliminary positive ruling by the ITA requires that a bond be posted. This bond, or tariff
in all but name, is, moreover, imposed not only on subsequent imports, but on inventory
currently on hand. No statutory trade protection, even in the days of Smoot-Hawley,
imposed such a penalty;
Second, a positive preliminary or final ruling by the ITA may act to restrain exports
regardless of the ITC final determination. Consider, for argument, cases in which the ITA
has ruled that subsidies are being provided or that an antidumping duty is warranted, yet
the final injury determination is negative. An increase in imports at any time after the ITC
ruling may, in the future, lead to demonstrable injury. Since "unfair" trade practices have
already been established, a future petition will be easily prepared. Further, any action that
"injures" a U.S. industry will lead to a favourable outcome for a subsequent petitioner. Injury
may, of course, be defined in a number of ways favourable to a domestic industry; loss of
market share being one that is readily identifiable.
Worse, for the exporter, the provision of "critical circumstances" can corne into play. "Critical
circumstances" occur when the importer "should have known" that imports are at an "unfair"
price and that there has been a "surge". A previous positive antidumping or countervail
l~ee Moore (1989), Shughart and Tollison (1985), and Baldwin (1986).
17A letter from the Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of Colombia, Fernando Cepeda, to Mr David Binder, Acting Director,
Office of Investigation, dated 17/6/81, concerning A-301-002, "Fresh-cut roses from Colombia" (1981) concerned exactly this
issue. Mr Cepeda notes that there had been previous antidumping petitions against the Colombia flower industry (in 1979
against roses and in 1977 against all fresh-cut flowers) that resulted in no direct relief to U.S. producers. He stated that "they
had an adverse impact on the fresh-cut rose trade. The uncertainty which such action created in the market and the financial
and administrative burden of their defense acted as a trade barrier ... the legal costs of thedefense can be very burdensome".
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finding is prima facie evidence that the importer "should have known".18 Thus, any future
duty under these statutes will be applied 90 days retroactive to the preliminary ITA
determination and can be selectively applied to individual companies. Appeals must wait
for the ITA final ruling. It would therefore seem reasonable that a preliminary and/or final
positive duty would produce a cautious response to any temptation by an exporter to expand
sales in the Unites States.
lSUte antidumping case of "Photo Albums from Korea" (petition filed on 30 January 1985) proves instructive. The South
Korean exporters would not (or could not) comply with the requirement that data be submitted in machine readable form.
Thus, the Department of Commerce used the information in the petition itself to set the final ad valorem duty (equalling the
dumping "margin') of 64.81 percent. According to the petition, apparently deemed by the Department of Commerce more
reasonable that the efforts of the Koreans, the U.S. price represented slightly over 35 percent of production costs. Further, the
ITA also discovered that Canada has previously found South Korea guilty of the same offense. The result was a finding of
"critical circumstances"; the duty was applied retroactively to 90 days prior to the preliminary finding by the ITA (Federal
Register, 16 July 1985).
CHAPTER 3
WHY PROTECTION VIA REGULATION?
3.1 Benefits
The increased clamour for protection, especially early in the 1980s, and the means by which
these demands were satisfied, served to advertise remedies that could be implemented
quickly and provide effective relief. The brief 1980-88 history of countervail and
antidumping petitions provides eight identifiable benefits to those pUrsuing protection.
First, and most obvious, countervail and antidumping investigations provide relief very
quickly. Duties in countervail cases appear, on average, within four months of a petition.
Those for antidumping take only six months (Table 2).
Second, duties are prohibitive, especially when compared to the low level of current U.S.
tariffs. Countervail duties assessed in preliminary International Trade Administration (ITA)
determinations between 1980 ap.d 1988 were almost three times the current U.S. average tariff
(14.8 versus 5.0 percent). Antidumping duties are six times that average, larger than the
largest average tariff on dutiable imports since the United States entered World War 11.19
These duties have increased in magnitude since 1986 (Table 2).
,
Third, the duties are applied immediately, to goods already warehoused in the United States
by the importer. Before sales can be made out of that inventory, a "bond" must be paid to
the Bureau of the Customs. Duties can also be applied retroactively, in "critical
circumstances" to 90 days prior to the ITA preliminary ruling. This yields protection within
one month for countervail or three months in antidumping investigations.
Fourth, the success rate {for the petitioner) is very high. There were 459 cases initialized by
the ITA between 1980 and 1988 that received a preliminary determination from the
International Trade Commission (ITC) and/or the ITA. Preliminary duties were assigned in
402 instances. Another 21 cases yielded suspension agreements or quotas without a
preliminary ruling. The overall success rate for a preliminary (or early) positive duty
determination is over 70 percent. This rate rises sharply once frivolous cases are dismissed.
Fifth, even if no duties are applied, there are non-trivial costs associated with defending
oneself against the charges. Estimates range from $100,000 to provide the most rudimentary
defense (Vermulst) to $4.0 million (Rugman and Anderson, 1988) for a full defense. The
latter example was for a case won by the Canadian softwood lumber industry in 1982.
Should the exporter fail to respond to the charges, the information in the petition will be
accepted by the ITA, and the duty requested by the petitioner will be granted. Unlike nolo
contendere in legal proceedings, there is little scope for plea bargaining.
Sixth, there is no effective domestic opposition.2o Neither the President, Secretary of
Commerce, nor any other non-Divine entity may intervene to change a preliminary or final
decision. Consumers, retailers, and manufacturers that use imported goods receive no
consideration in the determination. They are not permitted to submit evidence to either the
19Historical Statistics of the United States (1975).
2DDestler and Odell (1987) point out several cases in which domestic opposition to specific import restrictions has been
helpful in preventing or softening proposed measures of protection considered by the Congress.
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ITA or the ITC. The guilty exporter is officially labelled as someone selling a product at "less
than fair value" if the charge was antidumping. The pejorative for countervail is milder, but
public notices provide a litany of rhetorically exploitable "unfair" subsidies.
Seventh, the rules of evidence are easy. An antidumping duty is automatic whenever the
domestic price in the exporting country (or a third country in the absence of a domestic
market) is found to exceed the United States price. A case against a Japanese exporter is
virtually assured of victory: Japanese distribution systems are heavily laden with
middlemen, prices include premia for certainty of delivery, and domestic cartelization of a
number of industries effectively segments domestic and export markets.21 Other things
equal, prices on Japanese goods sold in Japan will be higher than those same goods sold in
the United States.
Pricing based on current production costs is also increasingly popular in antidumping cases.
The petitioner may allege that home sales in Japan, for example, are below the cost of
production. The ITA will then request that the company provide all expenditures relevant
to the production of the merchandise under investigation. A judgement that goods are sold
b~low the cost of production means that the "fair" price will be "constructed".22
"
"Constructed" prices may require higher costs than are economically justified. The exporting
company must spend at least ten percent of the price of the product on "general expenses",
such as marketing, and also earn an eight percent profit. There can be no "loss-leaders". The
conception of marginal cost, especially that which declines over th~ range of production, is
nowhere to be found. Joint costs which may be allocated between products are largely
ignored. Thus, high-technology goods make excellent targets of investigation. Companies
that economise on "general expenses" or temporarily accept lower profits will be penalised.
Phases of the business cycle are immaterial.23 No comparison with returns of domestic
firms in the same industry is permitted. "Constructed value" implies, in some industries, that
price is determined by a~ding together a superset of average (not marginal) input costs,
rather than in organised markets of buyers and sellers.
It should be no surprise, given the domestic pricing structure, an assumed joint production
of many goods, and the high technology character of many export industries in Japan, that
forty of the forty-two preliminary determinations for antidumping cases involving that
country resulted in duties. These duties were an average of 44.2 percent, ad valorem.
The eighth reason that a petitioner would seek an antidumping or countervail duty is the
highly technical nature of antidumping and countervail cases. This makes it unlikely that
21See The Economist (28 January 1989), pp.15 ("Cheaper Shopping in Japan") and 70-1 ("Gingering Japan's Dishibution
System"), for a description of retailing problems.
22The procedure is codified in the Code of Federal Regulations under Title 19, part 353,5, as published in the Federal Register
28 March 1989. p.12787.
23See Ethier (1982) for a more in-depth discussion. Dale (1980, p.199) notes a U.S. submission to the GATT antidumping code
negotiating session in 1966:
The use of "cost of production" when any comparable sale price can be found is subject to serious objection on both
theoretical and practical grounds. Sales at below cost do not necessarily involve price discrimination. For example,
domestic as well as export sales at below cost, can be normal business practice at times of business depression.
Even though the United States at one time formally recognized the business cycle causes of dumping, the ITA apparently ignores
downturns in evaluating price discrimination complaints. Instead (Vermulst, p.709) the ITA uses a "normal industry practice
test", which does not recognise pricing policies during recessions.
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otherwise interested people will be tempted to learn the way in which duties were calculated
and imposed. The stultifying language in the Federal Register entries reporting ITA and ITC
decisions discourages close reading, unless one is a party to the case and/or has a direct
interest. There are several terms which may have been designed to evade easy interpretation.
For example, "suspension of liquidation" indicates that a tariff has been imposed, and no
further sales out of the importer's inventory may be made without paying the penalty.
"Posting bonds" is a euphemism for collecting a preliminary or final duty before the final
determination. "Constructed value" says that cost is the only relevant determination of price.
A reasonable assumption is that most people, although one would hope not the majority of
economists, have little idea of the nature of the decisions made by the ITA. This assumption
may also be expressed as rational ignorance; there is no reason, at the margin, that the man
in the street perceives a net benefit from learning the minutiae of antidumping and
countervail cases.24 Those antidumping cases based on price discrimination state that U.S.
consumers should always pay the highest (most noncompetitive) price, regardless of how that
price was obtained. Thus, if Brazil protects itself from imports of brass by imposing a tariff,
then U.S. consumers should pay that Brazilian, tariff-ridden price on any imports from Brazil.
The end result is the spread of other countries' import protection to the United States.25
Rules have shifted to the benefit of the petitioner, and never, since the passage of the 1974
Trade Act, to the benefit of the accused party. Sales at prices that are temporarily below
production costs were not considered dumping before 1974, but have become a major way
to establish a dumping "margin". The question is whether or not such fluid notions of
"fairness", especially when the flow always benefits the domestic industry, imply that these
instruments are protection. The answer cannot, objectively, be no. No one knows, with
certainty, whether one's pricing behaviour will, at some undetermined future point, suddenly
switch from being acceptable to unacceptable.
Antidumping and countervail investigations and subsequent duties advance the cause of
protection, while successfully hiding that purpose. Exporters to the United States,
particularly Canadians (see Lipsey, Rugman and Anderson, and Morton). have continued to
complain about the rise in such protection,26 The dismal forecast implied by our model,
below, is that the process will become more lenient to the petitioner in the future, because
the petitioner is not the only beneficiary.
3.2 Granting Protection
Benefits of administered protection accrue not only to those who demand protection, but also
to those who broker import restrictions. This turns the population at large into possibly
unwilling (or at least unknowing) suppliers of income transfers to those who have
successfully petitioned for relief.
24This process of rational ignorance is encouraged by "optimal obfuscation", as described by Magee, Brock and Young (1987,
p.134): ''The principle of optimal obfuscation suggests that a party will shift to more indirect policies for redistributing income
so long as the electoral gains in voter obfuscation exceed the electoral cost of receiving fewer resources from the clientele lobby".
That is, these protectionist policies must be transparent to those desiring them, but not to those who pay the price (consumers,
retailers, etc.).
25Purthermore, exemption from import duties for inputs is countervailable, according to the ITA. Thus the ad valorem duty
not imposed by Brazil, for example, is imposed by the United States.
26Kelly, et al., state that complaints concerning U.S. antidumping and countervail investigations are by no means limited to
Canada (1988, p.lO).
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There is a strong principal-agent relationship between the budget authority (the trade
subcommittees in the House and the Senate) and the ITA.27 Legislators earn votes by
providing guidance for a constituent service. The ITA gains income by providing the service.
There is a close (but not one-to-one) association between changes in the ITA budget for the
division responsible for import investigations and the number of antidumping and
countervail cases handled (Figure 1).28 A sharp increase in the number of cases in 1982 was
accompanied by a real budget increase in 1983 (shown as 1982). Similarly, a declining
caseload in 1983 and 1986-7 were associated with slowdowns in the rate of increase in
revenue in subsequent years.
The strength of the principal-agent relationship should be most evident in periods when
trade protection is especially valuable to the legislator. Voter myopia magnifies the
importance of constituent services in election years. This works two ways. First, voters (or
campaign contributors) may expect increased service in an election year; a representative
may be more accessible during election-year events. Second, legislators may be more willing
to demonstrate their value by advertising the goods they have available. Tests should
therefore indicate that significantly more cases are begun in election than non-election years.
Flllther, we would expect negative outcomes (no duties provided) are absolutely (with a
stafistical certainty of one) more scarce the closer one approaches election day.
Many of the same reasons that petitioners find administered protection desirable also benefit
brokers of that protection. High tariffs and rates of success are marks in favour of the ITA
and the legislator in whose district (or state) the beneficiaries res,ide. The mitigation of
opposition provides no opportunity for embarrassing debate. Rather, the legislator can stand
in the forefront of a defense of "fairness". Complaints about the process are buried in
references to rules and procedures. Last, fast relief provides a means whereby a legislator
can qUickly capture the gains afforded by trade protection.
27'fhis is based on theories of delegation advanced by Aranson, Gellhom, and Robinson (1982); McCubbins and Page (1986);
and Wolf (1979). They have been supported by the theory of bureaucracy first articulated by Niskanen (1971). The delegation
theory is demonstrated in action by Fiorina (1978), and given empirical support by Weingast and Moran (1983).
"1BA similar result could not be obtained for the ITC; antidumping and countervail investigations are 10.1 percent of its
budget (See the ITC Annual Report, 1988). The chart represents the percent change in the real budget for the Trade
Administration Division, which conducts the investigation of antidumping and countervailing duty petitions. In 1987, the
Export Administration Division became separate. Fiscal years 1988-90 include Export and Trade Administration (now Import
Administration) together to be compatible with prior years.
Figure 1. ITA budget growth in percent and changes in the number of
antidumping and countervailing duty petition,s, 1980-88
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The 1980-88 period of antidumping and countervail law was stable. The supply of this mode
of protection is observed to be almost perfectly elastic: few petitions were refused. Virtually
every opportunity to earn revenue (in the form of political capital, future budget
appropriations, etc.) by the ITA was accepted. The quantity supplied is solely a function of
the position of the demand schedule.
The number of antidumping and countervail petitions is the dependent variable in direct tests
of increased demand for protection. The exchange rate hypothesis may be stated simply that
as the dollar rises in value, then more antidumping and countervailing duty petitions will
be submitted.
The political payoffs occur as one is closer to an election: more petitions should be filed in
an election than a nonelection year. There is no distinction between Presidential and
rpidterm elections. Our model specifies that the relevant actors are members of Congress and
people in the supporting bureaus. The President has no authority to change any countervail
or antidumping ruling. Therefore, the question of the Presidential election is moot.
Last, the rate o( growth in aggregate real income (GNP) may also affect the incentives to
seek trade protection: slower growth in aggregate demand may induce petitioners to seek
to restrict imports in order to maintain their sales in shrinking or stagnant markets. The
equation tested is then stated as:
where:
ALLCASE =CONSTANT + 131TWXALL + 132GNP + 133ELECTION (1)
ALLCASE =
TWXALL =
GNP =
ELECTION =
The total number of antidumping and countervail petitions,
The real exchange rate index weighted by the total number' of
cases brought,29
Real U.S. GNP, and
Dummy variable for an election year, equalling one for all four
quarters of an election year, zero if not.
2!l'fhe index was constructed as:
60
Index"" looII R!t
i-l
where
Wi weight for country i, held constant through the study period, for the 60 countries against which
antidumping or countervail petitions were brought between 1980 and 1988. Weights are shown
in appendix table A-I.
real exchange rate, in units per dollar, for country i in time t divided by the base period rate.
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Quarterly data was used from 1980-88, giving 36 observations. The expected signs on the
coefficients for TWXALL and ELECTION should be positive, and on GNP negative. Levels
were used for both the exchange rate and GNP. The variety of products involved and the
differing speed of import penetration in those markets makes a unique lag specification
unlikely.
The ordinary least squares results, with all variables (except ELECTION) in logarithms, are
in Table 3 for the combined total of antidumping and countervail petitions filed in each
quarter. All coefficients as specified in equation (1) are of the expected sign. The coefficient
on the exchange rate index based on all cases, TWXALL, implies that a 1 percent appreciation
in the real value of the dollar will lead to a 5.4 percent increase in the total of antidumping
and countervailing duty petitions. This exchange rate elasticity is significant at the one
percent level. The coefficient associated with real GNP is significant at the 10 percent level.
A 1 percent increase in real GNP will lower the number of petitions by 1.8 percent. This
result confirms earlier studies that relate business cycle conditions to regulatory activity,
particularly Takacs (1981) and Shughart and Tollison (1985). Last, an election year will
produce an 88 percent rise in the number of cases brought. The election year coefficient is
si~ficant at the one percent level.
The significance of the election year can be seen most clearly in considering how large a
change in the value of the dollar would be reqUired to offset the election year effect. A 16.3
percent depreciation is needed to counter the increased number of cases in an election year.
The regression, as a whole, explains almost 60 percent of the variation in the total number
of antidumping and countervailing duty cases. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates no first-
degree autocorrelation. These outcomes can be interpreted as strongly supportive of the two
central hypotheses. An exchange rate appreciation leads to an increase in the demand for
protection, as represented by the number of antidumping and countervail petitions. Second,
the filing of more petitions in an election year can be interpreted as a sign of pressure on (or
advertising by) legislators that may be satisfied by a favourable antidumping or countervail
petition.
Using the exchange rate index for total imports (TWXTR) and the Federal Reserve weighted-
average index (TWXFED) are also shown in Table 3. The magnitude of the signs of the
coefficients of the exchange rate variables and the election year variable were virtually the
same, although the exchange rate elasticity decreases when the Federal Reserve index is used.
The exchange rate and election year coefficients remain significant at the one percent level.
4.1 When are Decisions Made?
The "Political cycle" claims that more petitions for protection occur as elections come near.
This cycle also has another implication: decisions should also be more favourable as the
election is closer. Both the ITC and the ITA could make decisions harmful to protection-
seekers. The ITA could decide that no duty should be imposed. The major damage that the
ITC can do to an antidumping or countervail petition is to stop it in its tracks via a
preliminary negative injury determination. A decision that no domestic firm is now (or could
be) "injured" by imports will close the case, before any decision on the size of a duty can be
reached.
The assumption of voter myopia tells us that the chances of a negative determination should
fall as an election comes closer. Members of Congress are, by definition, more concerned
with favourable outcomes for their citizens (in the form of constituent service and otherwise)
as elections draw near. The recognition that one's representative is partially responsible for
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Table 3
Basic regression results for all cases combined anti-dumping and countervail
Dependent variable: ALLCASE
R-squared (corrected)
0.5962
Independent variable
CONSTANT
TWXALL
GNP
ELECTION
Durbin-Watson
2.0320
Coefficient
-6.7550
5.4071
-1.8151
0.6290
T Statistic
-0.7853
7.0328
-1.7052
3.5796
Alternative exchange rate test - exchange rate weighted for all ,trade
Independent variable
CONSTANT
TWXTR
GNP
ELECTION
Coefficient
-31.9450
6.1186
0.8358
0.6346
T statistic
-3.1802
6.7622
0.7875
3.5189
Durbin-Watson
1.9807
R-squared (corrected)
0.5768
Alternative exchange rate test· Federal Reserve exchange rate
Independent variable
CONSTANT
TWXFED
GNP
ELECTION
Coefficient
-25.4724
3.8297
1.3172
0.6399
T statistic
-3.1953
6.7575
0.7698
3.5179
Durbm-Watson
1.8905
R-squared (corrected)
0.5571
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increases (or decreases) in one's wealth provides an incentive to vote for (or contribute to)
the incumbent if he or she has recently "helped" deliver the goods (Kiernan, 1989).
The agency that assists the interested member of Congress has more to lose (the gratitude
of a Congressional sponsor at budget authorization time) the closer to the election that the
agency chooses to issue an unfavourable ruling. Conversely, the agency can minimize
negative political (and thus budgetary) costs by making adverse decisions outside the view
of a nearsighted electorate. One may also avoid Congressional harassment and the need for
providing time-consuming regular reports.
Some negative decisions may be necessary, moreover, to ensure that positive decisions are
more credible. The acceptance of all claims of injury or the belief that all imports are the
result of price discrimination cannot be correct; there are frivolous petitions filed and at least
one case where the price in the United States was higher than that overseas.30 A negative
decision enhances the reputation of objectivity (even if it is a rare occurrence), making a
positive decision more difficult for "outsiders" to challenge.
Those necessary negatives will, in standard economic theory, be made according to the
prll\ciple of cost minimization. A rational bureaucrat avoids a negative decision, close to an
election, that may produce poor press for an incumbent set of legislators. A potentially costly
decision for an incumbent could also be a costly one for the offending agency as well. Thus,
since some outward appearance of objectivity must be preserved, those statements of
objectivity in the form of decisions adverse to trade protection will fall farther from elections,
on average. They then cost the agency less because they cost the principal less.
The results shown in Figure 2 indicate that the likelihood of a negative preliminary decision
by the ITC is greater if it is reached over three quarters prior to an election than in the three
quarters just before. Negative determinations are approximately one in five between five and
eight quarters before an ele}tion, yet only one in ten if between zero and four quarters before.
The average number of days between a negative ITC preliminary decision and the next
election is 407.8 days. The average for a positive decision is only 332.8 days. Negative
decisions occur farther from elections than positive decisions.31
Figure 2 also shows the actual proportion of negative decisions plotted against an estimated
logit function. Negative ITC preliminary decisions were assigned the value of one. The only
independent variable was the number of days prior to the next election. The equation is
shown below in Table 4.
The evidence on the timing of ITC decisions is drawn on the population of antidumping and
countervail cases. The statements made concerning averages, percentages, and time are not
made with some hypothetical distribution in mind, or using artificially constructed variables
(exchange rate indices, real exchange rates, and GNP have some element of subjectivity in
construction). Therefore, probability statements are arguably inappropriate; we know the
results with certainty. A negative decision (no protection) is less likely, the closer the next
election.
3OGilmore Steel Corporation, for example, filed an antidumping suit against Belgium (29 September 1983) for hot-rolled
carbon steel sheet. The petition was dismissed because Gilmore did not produce the product. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., filed
a petition (11 November 1983) alleging th!1t a UK producer of choline chloride "dumped" their product in the United States.
The ITA, in both its preliminary (30 April 1984) and final (18 September 1984) decisions, found that prices were actually lower
in the Uilited Kingdom.
31Similar results (Stallings, 1990) were reached for ITA preliminary duty decisions, but are excluded for brevity.
Figure 2. ITC Negative Preliminary Decisions
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Table 4
Logit Results for ITC Preliminary Decisions
Dependent Variable: Negative ITC decisions
(l=negative, O=positive)
Independent variable
Constant
Number of days prior to election
Log-likelihood
-187.06
Coefficient
-2.2997
.0015
Chi-squared (454)
93.53
T statistic
-8.5158
2.4736
4.2 Rent-seeking and Administered Protection
Protection under antidumping and countervail rules is attractive because it is inexpensive:
the rent-seeking costs are low relative to the transfers received. This incomplete rent
dissipation can be observed quite easily, and leads to more protection than would otherwise
be the case. The following stylised example provides an illustration.
A firm that produces, for example, economics texts, has a falloff in sales. Let us call it, for
illustrative purposes, the J Smoot Company. Its lead salesman notices economics texts
manufactured in Japan in a local bookstore, at a 40 percent lower priced than those produced
by domestic companies, including Smoot. The directors of the Smoot Company (perhaps
along with union representatives) contact a trade lawyer in Washington, perhaps on the
advice of their Senator or Representative. The lawyers tell them they have a good potential
case of dumping. Furthermore, the average antidumping duty against Japanese goods will
close the price gap at the current level of imports.
The Smoot Company pays the lawyer, who prepares the petition in their name. The petition
reports higher prices either in Japan or Canada. Just for good measure, the accusations also
allege sales at below the cost of production. The lawyer, noting lots of previous experience
in handling Japanese cases, agrees to a $250,000 fee, representing a one year profit for a $2.5
million dollar firm earning 10 percent. Thus, a very small company chooses protection if an
alternative investment of $250,000 would still leave the Japanese manufacturer with a price
advantage.
The rules specify that the Smoot company must represent the industry, but if no other
economics text manufacturer complains, the ITA assumes that this is true. The question of
whether or not a petitioner represents an industry came up in the case of "Electrical
conductor aluminium redraw rods from Venezuela". The ITA stated that requiring that
Southwire, Inc. (the petitioner) prove its representation would be "onerous".32 Thus, many
32See the Federal Register of 30 Jillle 1988, p.24756.
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other manufacturers must respond to the petition if it is to be voided. This adds costs not
only to the importer, but to other industry members who oppose the petition.
Other economics text manufacturers clearly benefit from duties imposed as a result of Smoot
Company's action. Smoot Company therefore does not receive the full value of the transfer
resulting from the protection. It does receive enough of a transfer, at the margin, to
compensate it for the opportunity cost of the investment in protection.
Full dissipation of rents, economy-wide, will not occur. We therefore have a situation in
which a great deal of protection can be produced at a very low price. Raising the price of
obtaining that protection or lowering the potential for success would therefore reduce import
restrictions. Whether the rise in rent-seeking costs is greater than the gains from less
protection is an open question, but one may at least assume that less protection will be
sought.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The problem of increased demand for protection in the United States is not one of a
persistent appreciation of the dollar. Increased protection occurred because the tools to
restrict imports were available, easy to use, quick to implement, and virtually impossible to
fight. Only the winners are permitted to play the game. Consumers, retailers, and input
users, who are the losers from protection, are only observers.
The problem of appeals to and the success in achieving antidumping and countervail
protection may seem hopeless barriers to those who favour a liberal world trading system.
There is no incentive for ~he principal or agent to change the process except to improve the
probability that protection is granted. Judgements are cloaked in terms of fairness, and
criticism necessarily implies that the critic is opposed to fair play.
The use of administered protection will be reduced if rent-seeking costs are raised. This
would involve greater public awareness (Tullock, 1984) and the inclusion of affected
importers in the decision process (Destler and Odell, 1987). Further, allegations of predatory
pricing may be made subject to the same burden of proof as in U.S. antitrust law. This
would enormously expand the time period required for investigation.
United States antidumping and countervail laws may be minUcked in other countries.
Vermulst (1989) details unilateral interpretations by the United States, EEC, Australia and
Canada that have increased trade restrictions. As the dollar falls in value, foreign electoral
cycles notwithstanding, we may expect our exporters to be penalized by antidumping and
countervail statutes very similar to those used in the United States.
The empirical analysis used has focused on a period in which the institutions of administered
protection were stable. Therefore, the amount of protection offered was essentially a passive
function of demand. However, those who determine the price at which these instruments
of protection are offered are not passive. The supply side of protection, in the principal-agent
model, can be verified with the acceptance of institutional evidence. '
Bureaucrats and legislators gain from the promotion of restrictions on "unfair trade". Thus,
if exploitable "profits" remain from expanding the scope of administered protection,
entrepreneurs in the public sector will find them. It should be no surprise that antidumping
and countervail statutes continue to provide more opportunities for protection. The further
evolution of antidumping statutes in the Trade Act of 1988, to include "downstream
dumping" is an example of legislative attempts to broaden the reach of these laws. Further,
the Department of Commerce has proposed antidumping rules at the GAIT that could,
conceivably, widen the use of such devices.33 Despite the fact than an exchange rate
depreciation may reduce petitions for administered protection, the principals (Congress) and
agents (Department of Commerce) can maintain their viability by extending the use of
regulatory devices over which they have control. Entrepreneurship remains alive and well
outside the private sector.
33Lachica, writing in the Wall Street Journal (22 November 1989, p.A7) states: "the U.S. recommended that the international
trade organisation [GAlT) amend its 10-year-old dumping code to make it harder for companies to evade antidumping
penalties".
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Antidumping and countervail statutes allegedly defend U.S. producers from predatory
pricing practices of exporters to the United States. The relevant question is one of why
foreign goods are "dumped" or "subsidized" more frequently as the dollar appreciates or as
members of Congress seek votes (or campaign contributions). The answer is that
administered protection, as it has been with protection through history, is a solution partially
obtained by the political process.
The concerns expressed herein also apply to other tests of price discrimination, where
subjective notions of "fair prices" dominate the debate. When standard business and pricing
patterns become "unfair" by definition, the dynamic process of capitalism itself may be
threatened.
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APPENDIX
Table A-1:
Weights Used in Exchange Rate Indices
All anti-dumping U.S. Federal
and countervail merchandise Reserve Index
Country petitions imports
Argentina 2.4 0.4
Australia 0.9 1.0
Austria 0.7 0.2
Belgium 1.8 1.0 6.4
Brazil 7.9 1.9
.Canada 6.3 20.2 9.1
Chile 0.6 0.3
China 0.0 0.0
Taiwan 5.7 5.1
Colombia 1.5 0.3
y
Costa Rica 0.6 0.1
Czechoslovakia 0.0 0.0
Denmark 0.0 0.5
Dominican Republic 0.0 0.3
Ecuador 0.4 0.4
El Salvador 0.4 0.1
European Communities 0.4 0.0
Finland 0.4 0.2
France 5.2 2.6 13.1
German Democratic Republic 0.0 0.0
Federal RepUblic of Germany 4.4 6.1 20.8
Greece 0.4 0.1
Hong Kong 0.4 2.7
Hungary 0.6 0.1
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India 1.5 0.7
Indonesia 0.2 1.7
Iran 0.7 0.3
Ireland 0.2 0.3
Israel 1.7 0.6
Italy 5.0 2.7 9.0
Japan 9.4 20.1 13.6
Kenya 0.4 0.0
South Korea 5.9 3.2
Luxembourg 0.6 0.0
Macao 0.0 0.0
'\0
Malaysia 1.1 0.8
Mexico 6.3 5.8
Netherlands , 1.1 1.1 8.3
New Zealand 1.8 0.3
Norway 0.2 0.7
Pakistan 0.2 0.1
Panama 0.2 0.1
_0
Peru 1.5 0.4
Philippines 0.6 0.8
Poland 0.0 0.0
Portugal 0.7 0.1
Romania 0.0 0.0
Saudi Arabia 0.2 2.9
Singapore 1.8 1.2
South Africa 2.0 0.8
Spain 3.9 0.8
Sri Lanka 0.2 0.1
Sweden 1.1 1.1 4.2
Switzerland 0.6 1.0 3.6
Thailand 1.7 0.5
Trinidad and Tobago 0.4 0.6
33
Turkey 1.1 0.1
United Kingdom 2.8 4.9 11.9
Uruguay 0.2 0.1
USSR 0.6 0.2
Venezuela 2.8 2.2
Yugoslavia 0.9 0.2
Zimbabwe 0.2 0.0
Table A-2
Data Used in Regression Analysis
Year Quarter Exchange Exchange Federal Real U.S. Number of
rate based rate based Reserve GNP, anti-
on all anti- on total Index billion dumping
dumping merchandise (TWXFED) 1985 and
and imports dollars countervail
countervail (TWXTR) (GNP) petitions
cases (ALLCASE)
(TWXALL)
1980 I 69.3 76.6 63.6 3,587.4 6
II 69.4 76.3 64.3 3,502.6 4
III 67.6 74.3 62.5 3,504.9 6\7
N 68.2 74.9 65.6 3,549.4 8
1981 I 69.7 76.1 69.7 3,618.1 2
II 73.3 79.2 75.7 3,606.0 6
III 76.6 82.8 81.6 3,622.0 5
N
,
75.7 81.0 77.4 3;571.4 10
1982 I 78.1 83.2 80.0 3,517.5 29
II 81.0 86.3 82.5 3,528.0 24
III 86.4 90.7 87.0 3,499.8 31
N 85.8 90.1 87.7 3,505.2 10
1983 I 85.2 88.2 84.6 3,535.4 17
II 8~.9 90.1 87.0 3,615.0 11
III 90.2 92.2 90.9 3,668.4 18
N 91.1 92.4 91.6 3,733.5 23
1984 I 91.7 92.7 92.5 3,827.0 24
II 92.5 93.8 93.1 3,874.9 17
III 96.6 97.7 99.7 3,894.7 28
N 99.1 99.3 103.3 3,922.2 26
1985 I 102.1 102.7 109.1 3,969.1 28
II 101.5 101.4 103.6 3,993.2 23
III 99.7 99.5 97.3 4,033.8 33
N 96.0 95.7 89.6 4,063.3 17
1986 I 91.9 92.5 83.4 4,126.5 28
II 89.6 89.2 79.3 4,117.9 30
III 87.7 87.4 75.7 4,128.7 14
N 86.9 88.1 74.8 4,143.5 28
1987 I 84.4 85.9 70.2 4,190.1 4
II 82.0 83.2 68.4 4,241.5 4
III 82.0 83.6 70.1 4,288.4 12
N 78.7 80.3 65.8 4,352.5 3
1988 I 76.5 77.9 64.3 4,404.8 16
II 75.4 76.7 64.7 4,444.3 27
III 78.5 79.5 70.3 4,473.5 6
N 77.4 77.4 67.1 4,503.7 4
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